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Introduction 
Self-awareness has been investigated both 
theoretically and empirically by a wide range of 
disciplines (1-3). This has included the exploration of 
self-awareness among specific clinical groups, such 
as patients with right-hemisphere stroke, frontal lobe 
damage, schizophrenia, and autism. Still, a 
comprehensive model of self-awareness is lacking 
(3), and even the functional importance of self-
awareness has not yet been established (4). The lack 
of a comprehensive model of self-awareness limits 
the current understanding of variations in and 
deficits of self-awareness. 
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a 
neurodevelopmental condition characterized by 
difficulties with social communication and 
interaction as well as by repetitive patterns of 
behavior, interest, or activity, including differences in 
sensory responses (5). Specific characteristics of self-
awareness are not specified in the current diagnostic 
criteria. However, the term autism—which was first 
coined in relation to schizophrenia—comes from the 
Greek autos meaning “self”; Asperger’s (6) and 
Kanner’s (7) early and defining descriptions suggest 
variations in awareness of the self among their 
original cases (8). Subsequent clinical descriptions, 
autobiographies, and other types of contributions by 
individuals on the spectrum, as well as parent reports, 
indicate that there seem to be very relevant 
differences possibly related to self-awareness that can 
often be linked to some of the everyday difficulties 
associated with ASD. In line with the notion of a 
spectrum of disorder is the fact that the indicated 
differences appear very heterogeneous with regard to 
their expression and how people on the spectrum 
experience them. Differences in self-awareness may, 
for example, encompass the following: the sense that 
you do not know what you do not know and 
therefore have difficulty judging when it would be 
relevant to get more information; difficulty 
distinguishing between your own or others’ 
preferences and moods when you are together with 
them; perceiving your own actions (e.g., not being 
able to get out of the door in time for school, self-
destructive actions) as “freestanding” actions 
without any link to antecedents, current situation, 
others’ reactions, or your own thoughts or feelings. 
Addressing the concept of self-awareness and its 
potential differences among individuals with ASD 
should not be perceived as a devaluation of or a 
challenge to the validity of either the self-awareness 
or the selfhood of persons with ASD. Self-awareness 
and the experience of self are unique and valid for all 
persons. However, for each individual, the concept 
of the self and self-awareness may be more or less 
efficient for helping individuals to navigate in the 
world in a way that supports his or her everyday 
needs, helps him or her to reach goals, and meets his 
or her personal values. Insight into the characteristics 
and mechanisms of self-awareness may help people 
of all degrees of ability to calibrate this fine 
instrument and thereby improve their ability to 
navigate and manage the challenges of life. 
The aim of this short paper is to sketch a 
conceptual framework for describing self-awareness 
to begin to integrate the accumulating knowledge 
about characteristics of and variations in self-
awareness related to ASD. The formulation of a 
conceptual framework is important as a future 
common ground for the design and interpretation of 
new studies, theoretical discussions, and clinical 
work. It is especially important that the framework 
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encompass the wide individual variation in self-
awareness that may characterize ASD due to the 
heterogeneity of the condition. The framework 
presented consists of different putative levels and 
dimensions of self-awareness that are identified in 
selected theoretical contributions. It aims to span not 
just the “what” of self-awareness but also the more 
procedural and functional aspects of “how” and 
“when.” 
 
Levels of self-awareness: a general review 
Most theories tend to distinguish among different 
levels of self-awareness. On the basis of a review of 
nine different theories of self-awareness, Morin (9) 
has suggested four levels that can work as reference 
points for different theoretical conceptions and that 
may help researchers to compare, contrast, and 
integrate these theories: 1) unconsciousness; 2) 
consciousness; 3) self-awareness; and 4) meta-self-
awareness. At the unconscious level, the organism is 
unresponsive to both the self and the environment. 
At the level of consciousness, the organism focuses 
attention on the environment and on processing 
stimuli. At this level, a basic sense of self is involved, 
but mainly as a primitive experience of one’s body in 
relation to the environment, with the sense of self 
being implicit and diffuse. At the level of self-
awareness, the organism focuses attention on the self 
and on certain aspects of the self more directly. At 
the level of meta-self-awareness, an awareness of the 
self as being aware of either the environment or the 
self is added. Two dimensions are seen as underlying 
the graded distinctions between the levels: the 
perception of self in time and the complexity of the 
information being accessed and processed (9). At the 
lower levels, the information processed is of a more 
sensory and perceptual nature; this information is 
primarily situated in the immediate present. At the 
higher levels, the information processed is more 
conceptual and complex; this information is linked to 
the present as well as to the past and the future, 
thereby enabling the individual to plan, act, and 
monitor his or her actions on the basis of both 
previous experiences and future goals. 
 
Levels of self-awareness: a specific review for 
individuals with autism spectrum disorder 
The question of self-awareness among individuals 
with ASD has been addressed theoretically by 
different authors, some from within the autism 
research community (10-14) and others from a more 
philosophical standpoint (15-17).  
Hobson (10) argues that self-awareness is 
dependent on the individual being a self. With 
inspiration from Buber’s theoretical work (18), 
Hobson specifies two modes of being a self and 
therefore of self-awareness. In the first mode, which 
Hobson calls self-awareness, the self is distinct from 
non-self (I-It). This is an impersonal distinction 
between the organism and all other things. In the 
second mode, reflective self-awareness, the self is distinct 
from other selves (I-Thou). This is a personal 
distinction that allows for an outside perspective on 
one’s own attitudes. The awareness of the self as 
distinct from the non-self is seen as a prerequisite for 
reflective self-awareness. The distinction between 
the modes is gradual, and reflective self-awareness 
itself includes a continuum that is based on an 
increasingly complex conceptualization of the self. 
Hobson argues that awareness of the self as distinct 
from the non-self is typically unaffected in 
individuals with ASD, whereas the distinction of the 
self from other selves may not be conceptually 
differentiated enough to support reflective self-
awareness in these individuals. With the distinction 
of the self from other selves and the notion of 
reflective self-awareness as a continuum based on the 
increasing complex conceptualization of the self, this 
seems potentially to map onto both Morin’s 
description of self-awareness and meta-self-
awareness, with the differences in ASD linked to 
these levels. 
Powell and Jordan (11) have suggested that 
individuals with ASD are characterized by deficits in 
personal episodic memory. They describe deficits of 
both encoding and recall that arise from problems 
with the development of an “experiencing self” 
responsible for coding events as something 
experienced by and thus belonging to the self. 
Deficits in this encoding would lead to deficits in 
personal episodic memory, with the person being 
able to recall personal facts and knowledge but 
“unable to remember themselves as performing 
actions, participating in events or possessing 
knowledge and strategies” (11: p. 361). The 
experiencing self is also seen as allowing the 
individual to search his or her memory independently 
of specific situational cues, with the recall of episodic 
memory otherwise being dependent on situational 
clues (11). Powell and Jordan see this independence 
of situational clues as essential for problem solving 
that involves reflection on personal experiences, 
strategies, and knowledge. In relation to Morin’s 
levels, remembering personal facts and knowledge 
seems to relate to the level of consciousness and self-
awareness, whereas remembering the self as acting 
and participating and as processing knowledge and 
strategies seem to relate to the level of meta-self-
awareness, both due to the representational 
complexity of the self and to the implied perception 
of the self across time. Powell and Jordan’s 
reflections are primarily focused on the flexible use 
of personal information in time, but the dimension 
of conceptual abstraction is also relevant to the 
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descriptions of experiences being encoded as 
personal and this conceptualization as being essential 
for later recall. 
Frith and Happé (12) build on the cognitive 
account that persons with ASD may have impaired 
“theory of mind” (ToM), which refers to the ability 
to represent the mental states of the self and others. 
Frith and Happé focus on introspection and suggest 
that a mind without introspective awareness would 
consist only of first-order representations, which 
would primarily be descriptions of objects and events 
on a concrete descriptive and perceptual level. What 
may be different in individuals with ASD would be a 
meta-representational level, where the first-order 
representation is re-represented, thereby 
differentiating the propositional attitude (e.g., desire, 
belief, pretense), the content (i.e., believing “X”), and 
the source status (i.e., who holds the belief: the self 
or the other). Potential problems that follow from a 
lack of or differences at the level of meta-
representations may include the difficulties to 
distinguish between one’s own and others’ opinions 
or trouble understanding why you act as you do. 
More recently, Happé (19) has expanded and further 
defined some of the potential downstream 
developmental effects of problems with “reading 
[one’s] own mind.” Happé also highlights how some 
of these developmental effects may also be 
beneficial, such as the personal perspective being less 
conforming and less restricted by assumed 
knowledge (19). The differences in self-awareness 
among individuals with ASD are understood 
primarily as differences at the meta-representational 
level of processing, which are also responsible for 
problems representing other people’s thoughts or 
ToM. In relation to Morin’s levels (9), the differences 
among individuals with ASD as proposed by Frith 
and Happé seem to fall mainly at the level of meta-
self-awareness. 
Raffman (15), who is coming from a philosophical 
perspective, suggests different ways of 
conceptualizing deficits of self-awareness and 
highlighting the different levels of awareness 
introduced in Frith & Happé’s argument (12). 
Raffman views self-knowledge as a cognitive 
achievement, whereas self-awareness is viewed in 
two different senses: a “thin” sense of self-awareness 
and a “strong” sense of self-awareness. The thin 
sense of self-awareness involves the direction of 
attention and is non-conceptual; it is viewed as direct, 
immediate, and non-inferential. The strong sense of 
self-awareness is characterized as introspection and 
self-knowledge. Self-awareness in the thin sense is 
the source of introspection and self-knowledge and 
as such the foundation of self-awareness in the 
stronger sense (15). Self-awareness in the strong 
sense involves a conceptual judgement, in ToM 
terms, of the thin sense of self-awareness; this 
conceptual judgement is involved in both the 
conceiving and reporting of this knowledge. In 
relation to ASD, Raffman argues that difficulties with 
self-awareness could be understood more as 
difficulties with representing and reporting mental 
states in ToM terms rather than as a lack of 
awareness of these states as such. Raffman goes on 
to add the possibility that some of the differences in 
self-awareness in individuals with ASD could be 
related to potential differences in the self-ascription 
of mental states based on differences in perceptual 
processing. 
Raffman suggests that differences in self-awareness 
among individuals with ASD is a question of the 
character of the mental state one is having rather than 
a question of having or not having mental states as 
such (15). Raffman adds to the discussion of the 
relationships between the levels and makes explicit 
how more basic deficits or differences can affect the 
higher levels of processing. Thus, deficits or 
differences in self-awareness—although they may be 
seen at a higher level of awareness processing—may 
be explained by processing difficulties at more basic 
levels (e.g., perception), because these are the source 
of self-awareness and so influence all levels. In 
relation to Morin’s levels (9), the strong sense of self-
awareness is seen as indicative of meta-self-
awareness, whereas the thin sense of self-awareness 
is related to both the level of consciousness and the 
level of self-awareness. Raffman’s suggestions with 
regard to self-awareness among individuals with 
ASD place a potential difference at the levels of 
meta-self-awareness and consciousness, with 
potential differences here influencing the higher 
levels of processing (15). 
McGeer (16) argues that self-awareness is the 
direction of attention during an experience of the 
world. In self-reports, it is these experiences of the 
world that are being reported directly. In contrast 
with the levels suggested by Frith and Happé (12), 
McGeer (16) argues to collapse the distinction 
between an experience and the awareness of that 
experience. When you are aware of “X,” it is not the 
experience of something that you are aware of; 
rather, you are simply experiencing “X,” and during 
this experience you are aware of “X” itself. In this 
sense, McGeer also seems to challenge the notion 
that a concept or representation of the self is 
necessary for this type of self-awareness. However, 
McGeer does recognize a cognitive awareness as a 
sophistication of this basic self-awareness, which 
includes the understanding that the actuality of world 
may differ from one’s subjective experience. In 
relation to Morin’s levels (9), cognitive self-
awareness is clearly related to the level of meta-self-
awareness. The level of direct self-awareness during 
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the experience seems related to both consciousness 
and self-awareness, and it seems in many ways to be 
closely related to Raffman’s thin sense of self (15). 
The connection to ASD is less explicit. In line with 
Raffman’s second suggestion, McGeer suggests that 
differences in sensory perception may influence the 
developmental process of higher-order social 
cognitive abilities, thereby resulting in social 
cognitive difficulties, which is one of the defining 
characteristics of ASD. 
Williams (14) addresses aspects of self-awareness in 
his review of studies examining the “theory of own 
mind.” Williams concludes that, although an 
awareness of one’s own mind—the psychological 
self, is dependent on metarepresentations, this level 
of representation is not so necessary for reflexive 
awareness of the physical self. Further, differences in 
self-awareness that have been described for persons 
with ASD seem to be primarily evident in relation to 
tasks and aspects related to awareness of the 
psychologicial self. With this in mind, Williams (14) 
argues for the relevance of distinguishing between 
the physical and psychological domains of the self in 
the understanding of self-awareness. Recent studies 
of interoception (percieving the internal state of 
one’s body) have indicated that persons with ASD 
may be characterised by atypical interoception (20), 
which challenges the idea of intact awareness of the 
physical domain of the self in these persons. 
However, Shah and colleagues (21) investigated the 
relevance of comorbid alexithymia and found that 
“Alexithymia, not autism, is associated with impaired 
interoception” (19: p. 215). 
The distinction between the physical and 
psychological domains of the self as suggested by 
Williams is not explicitly represented in Morin’s 
levels of awareness (9), and whether it makes sense 
to consider the level of meta-self-awareness in 
relation to the domain of the physical self is not quite 
clear. In Table 1, this distinction has been merged 
with Morin’s levels of awareness, and the presented 
theories of deficits or variations in self-awareness 
among individuals with ASD have been mapped 
onto the model. With the distinction between the 
physical and psychological domains of the self, it 
becomes clear that the differences suggested by the 
other authors are also primarily related to the domain 
of the psychological self. 
 
 
 
TABLE 1.  Suggested differences in self-awareness for persons with autism spectrum disorder mapped onto levels of self-awareness and domains of the self 
 
Level and definition 
(Morin, 2006) 
 
Physical self 
 
Psychological self 
 
   
Specific difficulties related to awareness of the 
psychological self (W) 
 
 
 
4. Meta-self-awareness  
Being aware that one is 
self-aware 
 
  
 Difficulties with meta-representing (FH) 
 Difficulties with conceptualizing or reporting in 
mentalizing terms (R) 
 C
o
n
ce
p
tu
al
 c
o
m
p
le
xi
ty
 
3. Self-awareness 
Focusing attention on 
the self;  
processing self-
information 
 
 
 Problems with the conceptual differentiation of the 
self from other-selves (H) 
 Experiences not encoded as personal (PJ) 
 
2. Consciousness 
Focusing attention on 
the environment; 
processing external 
stimuli 
 
 
 
 
 Differences in perceptual processing leading to different mental states affecting later levels of awareness (R) 
 Differences in sensory processing (M) 
 
 
1. Unconsciousness 
Being unresponsive to 
the self and the 
environment 
 
 
 
FH, Frith and Happé (12); H, Hobson (10); M, McGeer (16); PJ, Powell and Jordan (11); R, Raffman (15); W, Williams (14).  
 
 
 
 
Dimensions of self-awareness 
As mentioned previously, Morin’s levels are defined 
by the perception of the self in time and the 
complexity of the information being accessed and 
processed. Morin further identifies and promotes the 
variables of frequency, amount, and accuracy of self-
awareness as relevant for understanding an 
individual’s level of self-awareness. The term frequency 
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of self-awareness refers to the engagement of the 
individual in either situational or dispositional self-
observations; the amount of self-awareness refers to the 
quantity of self-information and seems to relate to 
both the type and extent of self-knowledge; and the 
accuracy of self-awareness refers to the quality of the 
information, such as the degree of consistency of the 
information as compared with the actual situation, 
with patients with brain injuries and psychiatric 
disorders such as schizophrenia providing case 
examples of inaccurate self-awareness. These 
variables can all be seen as more procedural and 
functional aspects of self-awareness, and, as such, 
they seem to be essential to describe the potential 
quality, efficiency, and usability of self-awareness in 
neurotypical individuals and individuals with ASD. 
However, these concepts are only briefly introduced 
in Morin’s review, and they are not directly addressed 
in the work summarized previously regarding self-
awareness among individuals with ASD. This 
procedural aspect of self-awareness is also evident in 
the theoretical distinction made by Crosson and 
colleagues (22) and summarized by Prigatano (3) in 
his summary of 20 years’ work on understanding 
disturbances of self-awareness. The distinction that 
is made is that different deficits are related to one of 
the following: 1) an intellectual awareness (i.e., 
knowing that you have a problem); 2) emergent 
awareness (i.e., knowing that you have a problem 
when it occurs); or 3) anticipatory awareness (i.e., 
knowing in advance that you have a problem that will 
affect future behavior or functioning). This 
distinction highlights the idea that, when it comes to 
understanding self-awareness, it is not just a question 
of having self-awareness; when and how the 
individual comes to understand this self-awareness 
and how it is applied must also be considered. 
Being self-aware is not always necessary and may 
sometimes be a hindrance to effective functioning, 
especially if the individual is not able to flexibly 
regulate his or her self-awareness. I would suggest 
that it is necessary to consider an additional 
dimension that addresses the attunement between 
the organism and the context. Here, the idea of 
attunement means the extent to which self-awareness 
is relevant to making the most of, on one hand, the 
prerequisites and objectives of the organism and, on 
the other, the prerequisites, requirements, and 
demands inherent in the context. The dimension of 
attunement is in many ways influenced by the 
variables of frequency, amount, and accuracy 
suggested by Morin (9), but it can also be seen as 
dependent on the relevance, timing, and potential 
self-directed control of both the activation of the 
different levels of self-awareness and the translation 
of this information into relevant action. Relevance is 
implicit in this understanding of attunement; it refers 
to the pertinence of the content of self-awareness 
relative to the organism and the context. For 
example, in a classroom, certain actions are required 
by the persons participating. In this context, 
awareness of the self in relation to these 
requirements is more relevant than other aspects of 
the self. Likewise, if one of the children in the 
classroom is easily distracted by noise, then that 
child’s awareness of his or her current level of 
concentration, task behavior, reactions to the level of 
noise, knowledge of previous reactions, the outcome 
of these reactions, and special arrangements with the 
teacher (e.g., being allowed to put on earmuffs) are 
more important for him or her to be aware of at that 
moment as compared with other aspects of self. 
In addition, what is relevant may change quickly if 
elements of the context or the individual’s motive 
changes. Sometimes self-awareness of certain self-
information may hinder efficient behavior, such as 
becoming aware of a trembling voice when 
commencing an academic presentation or ruminating 
on past actions while trying to go to sleep. Similarly, 
a lack of self-awareness may be equally disruptive, 
such as not registering or differentiating the bodily 
signals of stress and anxiousness until actually 
experiencing a “meltdown.” Timing reflects that the 
awareness of the same bodily signals at any other 
time, while still potentially relevant, may not be as 
helpful as being aware of them in a specific situation 
in which it is still possible to influence the situation 
and one’s own reaction to the situation. Relevance is 
often highly interrelated with timing. The term self-
regulation refers to the ability of an individual to 
identify moments in which it is relevant to activate or 
deactivate certain aspects of self-awareness and to 
actually regulate his or her self-awareness 
accordingly; this is a procedural aspect that is closely 
related to the level of meta-self-awareness. In this 
sense, a high degree of attunement is an essential 
foundation for efficient problem solving. 
Attunement may be seen as a relevant dimension at 
all four levels, and a balance among the different 
levels may in itself be relevant for more optimal 
attunement. This will ensure that the information 
that is processed, represented, and reflected on is 
linked to the past and the current situation as well as 
to an anticipated future context. 
 
Conclusion and perspective 
To sum up, the framework suggested for 
understanding and discussing variations and 
differences in self-awareness in individuals with ASD 
revolves around four levels of self-awareness across 
varying domains of the self. In various theoretical 
positions related to self-awareness among individuals 
with ASD, differences in self-awareness have been 
suggested at all levels (except the level of 
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unconsciousness); however, these differences may 
relate primarily to the psychological domain of the 
self. The levels are differentiated on the basis of the 
degree of conceptual complexity and the perception 
of the self in time and are, as such, closely related to 
the content of awareness. More procedural and 
functional aspects of self-awareness are highlighted 
with the concept of attunement. Attunement as 
presented here refers to variables of frequency, 
amount, accuracy, timing, relevance, and self-
directed control; all of these aspects are relevant for 
understanding the how and when of self-awareness 
in the interaction between the organism and the 
context. The presented framework is not seen as a 
final model of self-awareness for individuals with 
ASD; it of course requires further research and 
elaboration. However, this framework may be a 
helpful stepping-stone along the path. The intention 
is that the conceptual framework presented in this 
commentary may help to direct future research and 
to organize relevant findings and discussions in the 
continued investigation of self-awareness among 
individuals with ASD. This framework may also help 
to organize empirical evidence from studies that 
investigate concepts such as executive functioning, 
mentalizing, autobiographical memory, self-
regulation, and metacognition; although these 
concepts may not directly address the concept of 
self-awareness, together they may all add to the 
understanding of self-awareness in individuals with 
ASD. From a clinical perspective, understanding the 
variations of self-awareness could help with the 
identification and modification of interventions to 
support the development of self-awareness or 
compensatory strategies. It may also help us to 
understand the mechanisms of change and the 
challenges associated with ASD interventions, 
thereby helping us increase the effectiveness of 
clinical practice. 
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